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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

\\.r ALKER BANK AND
P ANY) a corporation)

TRt~ST

CQjy[-

j

Plaiutiff iiJid ReJ pond m!.

I, Case 1:'\O~

vs.

9098
I

NEW YORK TERlvfiNAL WAREHOUSE

)

COMPA r\'~{~ a corporation,

Defendant and Appeilanl.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The District Court of Salt Lake County, Hon_ fv[errill C.
Faux presiding, entered money judg1nent in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendanL The defendant has appealed

from the judgment.
The complaint:t follo~'iting a conversion theory, claimed

that defendant~ Ne'v York Terminal Warehouse Company,
1
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without authority from the plaintiff bank, w rongf ull y delivered
plaintiff's merchandise to a third person (R. 1·2). Defendant

pleaded a \Varehousing agreement with plaintiff, ctaim.ing
delivery in a ceo rd a nee ~T i th that agreement) estoppel of plain tiff
to claim conversion, and payment (R. 15-17). The pre-trial
order reframed the issues to show that the pJaintiff claimed
jus tifi cation in delive I in g by virtue of an agreement betv.t een
pJaintiff and de-fendant and another agreement between plaintiff
and John R. Woods. The estoppel issue \Vas retained as to each

delivery and all deliveries (R+ 18·22) ~
1'I i al \\-'as be£ ore the Hon. Mer ri 11 c+ .Faux' sitting without
a jury. Plain tiff introduced a s ta tern en t of indebtedness of
John R. Woods to it (R. 35, Exhr P-1); tw-elve warehouse
receipts issued by defendant (R. 36, Exh. P-2); five delivery
order5 shov.ring delivery of merchandise to John R+ Woods~
together \V 1th five checks dra'vn on plain tiff and signed by
\Xi oods ( Rr 36, Exhr P- 3) ; a summary of va] ues of !terns
claimed to have been converted (R. 37, Exh. P -4) , and instruc·
tion s to defend ant? s storekeeper ( R~ 3 7) Exh. P- 7) .
Having ii1 trod uc ed the above ex hi bits, plaintiff rested and
objected to the introduction of evidence

by defendant (R. -12).

Defendant thereupon moved for judgment of nonsuit of the
ground that the plaintiff had not made a prima fade case ( R.
42, 47, 49). 1''he Court overruled both motions

(RT 49 and

6 5) , and defendant proceeded with its proof.

documentary
evidence relating to receipts and deliveries of merchandise, but
called as its witnesses (or introd~ed deposition testimony of)
all the individuals most directly connected ·with the transDefendant produced not only the material
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actions at the times they occurred: C. ]. Holt, defendant's

vice-president in charge of West Coast sales

an~ operations

(R. 65-66); H. A. Robbins, who was, during the course of
the transactions, manager and vice-president of plaintiff's
Murray branch, with general authority to bind the plalnbiT

in contract .and to make loans (R+

21~ 108), and

who handled

the transactions for p 1aintiff; John R. Woods, .an appliance
jobber indebted to the plain tiff., and V/ ith ref e renee to whose
business the warehouse receipts had been issued in the first
pla(e (R. 188); and Harvey R. Moorehead, a former employee
of defendant) Vtrho had been storekeeper in the defendant's
warehouse during much of the time material to the action

(R+ 143).
These four were the dramatis personae+ Their testimony~
as the fallowing resume shows, contained substantially similar
stories of the series of transactions involving plain tiff, defend·
ant, and John R. Woods~

Testimony of C. f Holt. In the spring of 1956 Holt met
with H. A. Robbins and John R. Woods in plaintiff's Murray
Bran~ bank) Woods having asked

bins the

po ssi blli ty of issuing

against stored mer chan dlse

Holt to discuss with Rob-

ware house receipts to the bank

as a credit arrangement for Woods

(R. 66). It \vas agreed that warehouse receipts might be issued
to the bank and that the bank and 'W'oods would arrange the
method of handling the loan~ but no definitive agreement was
reached at that time ( R. 67) . Holt heard not bing more concern·
ing the transaction until the storekeeper at the Salt Lake ware~
house sent papen; to clef end ant's Los Angeles office with a
request that warehouse receipts be issued to the bank. Receipts

3
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Vle re is sued ( R. 6 7) . Again silence.

Nothing £urther \vas

heard from the bank until deliveries had been made to Woods
and a delivery order (authorizing such delivery) had come in
signed by the bank (R. 67). Ex(ept for periodic receipt of
such signed delivery orders~ dcfendanfs next communication
from the bank \vas a letter dated October 16, 1956 (R~ 68),

The letter, Exhibit D-5, 1s reprinted in Appendix A. Holt
\Vrote a reply Jetter to plaintiff stating that he took the October
16th letter to mean that th c war ehouse•nan was authorized
to deliver the ~oods upon receipt of a check from Woods.
This letter~ to gcth er ~T ith a suggested \\" areho use agreement bet~-ecn p! ai n tiff and de£ en dan t, is r epr in ted as A pp en dixes B and
C. Defendant received no reply to its letter, and attempts by Holt
to con tact Rob bins personally proved unsuccessful (R. 6 8-69) _
Defendant maintains a recon.l sys tern as a •nean 5 of keep·
ing constant control over stored merchandise~ Upon receipt
of goods in the ~· areho use a receiving report is sent to de fendant's los Angeles office by the local storekeeper. From that
report Los Angeles prepares warehouse receipts and forwards
them to the warehouse receipt holder (plain tiff) , sending

011 c

copy to the store keeper, retaining another copy and forwarding
one to the l'iew York office for processing on IBM cards.
Each day the 1ocal storekeeper sends in a report showing
whether or not he received or delivered me rc:han di se during
the course of the particular day. As deliveries are made, the
storekeeper prepares d eJ j very orders for merchandise that has
been shipped and posts his copy of the delivery order to his
copy of the \~· a.reho use receipt. He sends co pies of the de livery
order to Los Angeles on the day of its issue. There the delivery
order is recorded and for~varded to the IBM department for
l

4
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processtng. The storekeeper. s records include a copy of the
receiving report) the warehouse receipt under which it is
stored, and the delivery order. The warehouse receipt copy is
kept posted to reflect the amount of rna te rial remaining in the
\\'arehouse under that receipt

(R. 70).

Los Angeles keeps a running acc:ouot of merchandise in

each of its .field warehouses. One of the records is a. control
sheet on which the in£or rna tion on the dai 1y reports is recorded
as they are received from the storekeeper-one daily report
being received for each day The information from the daily
7

report is also recorded on the copy of the delivery order
received from the storekeeper. The information is passed on

to the 1BM department for processing. Receipt of the white
copy of the delivery order at the Los Angeles office gives the

employees there notice that the original of the deli very order
is somewhere along the route of storekeeper to receipt holder
to

Los Angeles

office~

A file of the daily reports is maintained together with
warehouse receipt copies and delivery order originals. In add i ·

tion to the white copy of the del (very order, sent to it directly
by the storekeeper~ Los Angeles receives the original signed
delivery order from the bank. The originals usually come in
by mail; upon being received they are opened and tiine-stamped;
they thus show the exact date and time of receipt in the Los

Angeles office ( R~ 71-72) .
If~

in checking its recordsJ Los Angeles found it necessary
to make corrections in an original delivery order, the bank
would be notified of. the error, which usually ~· o uld be Vtt' ith
reference to a lot number or a model number or a serial number

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or nsome such minor correctionn ( R+ 72) + From the various
reports received from the stoJekeeper and the bank _the Los
Angeles office would prepare a ··stock and value report~'·

\·..-hich is an IR;\-f tabulated report of the activity of the .invenr
tory ( R. 77) . It was defendant's practice~ at the time of audits
of the \v areho use, to bring the IBM report up to date from
the records of the storekeeper~ physically check the inventory
and, upon return of the auditors to the Los Angeles office~
to vcr i fy that dcl ivcry ord c rs had been received from the warehouse receipt ho Jd er s cl caring all in vcn tory that had been
delivered since the last IBM report Once a month a copy of
the ··stock and value·' report was forwarded to plaintiff and
another copy to the storekeeper. There was an ... automatic''
check to see that the \-Varehouse company had delivery orders
to cover all goods theretofore delivered~ At the time of auditing

arch ous c~ m crchandis e shown by the report to be in the
~varehouse ~vas physically inventoried (R. 78) ~ If goods ·were
miss1ng from the \van~~ouse defendant would request a deli very
order from tp.e bank (R. 79).
th c

Vi.-T

Defendant interpreted the plaintiffs October 16th letter
as meaning defendant should deliver merchandise on receipt

of a ch cck ( R. 8 2) and construed plaintiffs failure to answer

defendanfs November 12th letter as an acceptance of this
construction (R. 84) . The purpose of the enclosure ·with
defendant's letter (Appendix C) was to permit the bank to
place additional restrictions upon the delivery of materials so

that it might protect itself further (R~ 88).
On or about May 6~ 1957~ T. B. Akeley, an auditor in

defendant's Los Angeles office't sent a communication to the
6
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Salt Lake storekeeper telling him that ·~until further notice
from me or from my Los Angeles office no further goods
may be delivered or removed from our leased warehouse area.n
On about May 10. 1957j Holt went to Salt Lake City to close
out the warehouse. At that time he prepared a delivery o rdcr
for the five or six units remaining in the \varehouse, obtained
a check from \X'oods, and personally mailed check and delivery
order to the bank.
In his capacity as

vice~president

of New

v-or~

Termjnal

Warehouse Company Holt made inspections of the field warehouse in Salt Lake City (R. 2 2 3) . He made ins pee tions in

July of 1956 and in December of 1956 at which time he checked
the physical inventory at the wa. rehouse against the IBM records
at the office (R. 223). In December of 1956 the inventory

agreed with the company records (R. 223).
Testimony of H. A. Robbins . Robbins did most of plaintiff· s work with W~oods (R. 211 ) . He recalled setting up a loan
arrangement for Woods (R. 110) and would possibly have
discussed it with Woods (R. 111) He recalled that the merchandise would be paid for by checks, that John R. Woods'
7

and that it ~VaS not his
understanding that Woods would have to come to the bank
first before v. dthdrawing material from the warehouse (R. 111~

checks

\Vere

118, 120)

acceptable as

payments~

+

During the operation of the warehousing agreement he

received delivery orders from the storekeeper (R. 113) or
from Woods (R. 113). He \vould sign one and send it to Los
Angeles ( R7 1 14) ~ but he would hold the delivery orders un t lJ
the Woods' check was paid (R. 114) 125). Frequently he would
7
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ho 1d a check until deposits had been

made into the account by

Woods (R. 115). He knew that Woods was a umerchandise
jobber" and that such jobbers ordinarily sell to retailers {R.
115)+

16~
\\'a y

When Robbins sent the letter to defendant on October
l956j it Vilas not his intention to make any change in the
vla rehousing \Yas being handled ( R~ 11 7)

+

Rob bins saw \X' 0() ds f r equen tJ y-a bout ., twice a week,
( R. 119). Three or four tilnes between April of 1956 ( v-.Then
the .first delivery orders \vere issued) and May of 1957 (v.then
the warehouse was cJ os ed) , agents

n1ade inspections of the \\o"'arehouse

01

~·in

employees of the bank

a general

Vt~"ay'' (R~ 1.21).

The inspectors ~To uld ex amine the quarters to sec whether
the merchandise \Vas properly set asid~ and taken care of;
they would compare serial numbers on the delivery orders

(R. 121). It was their duty to report shortages to the bank
(R. 121). Robbins testified a second time that bank inspectors
~-·ere sent to Iook at the goods ( R. 21 7) ~ Plain tiff bank never
to Jd t hc v.ra rehouse company that conditions were uns atis factory
(R. 217). There must have been a report to the bank (R. 219).
On one or two occasions there v.rere a cou pie

of

units ~·that

might not have be en there,'' and this was mentioned to Robbins

by a field man (R. 20 0) ~ When shortages

~vere found plain tiff

called them to the attention of Woods~ not defendant) \vhere-

upon Woods would give delivery orders

(R.

220~ 221).

Delivery orders received by the bank .showed on their

face that the merchandise ha.d been received by Woods (R.
122). "l'he bank would sign them later (R. 122) although
they were already signed by Woods (R. 122) . The last five
8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

delivery orders, for which the action was brought, were found
by Robbins on his desk (R . 123). It was usual for him to find
dellvery orders on his desk (R. 123). Prior to closing of the
warehouse Woods had mentioned to Robbins that it would
be closed (R. 124) and had made arrangements for .a cashier's
check with which to pay storage charges ( R_ 1.24).
During the time in which \X1oods w·as using the warehouse

receipt arrangement he was overdraft with the bank part of
the time, and at other times the bank paid checks from his

account even though there v..-'as no mo~ey in it (R. 127~ l2H).
He knew that in purchasing goods from wholesalers some
retail dealers nftooredt) their units (R. 128). It was not Ivlr.
Robbins' understanding that the bank would take any steps
in connection ~rith the delivery orders before merchandise was
removed from the warehouse ( R. 212) . When a de li'Yery order
was received with a check from John R. Woods~ it .;vas assumed
that the goods had been delivered by the time the bank got the
deli very order . ( R. 213) , or would be without the bank doing

anything, further (R. 213~ 214) . The trial judge stated that
this is what he would take Mr. Robbins~ testimony to mean
(R. 216).

·restimon)' of fohn R. Woods. John

R~

Woods ran a distributing business in Salt Lak c City during 'Nhich time he had
dealings with Walker Bank, particularly ~rith Robbins~ for
four or five years (R. 189-190). With reference to merchandise
in defendant's warehouse~ it \vas Woodst agreement with the
bank that he could take the merchandise out and then pay
Walker for it (R. 190) . Robbins agreed to hold the checks
for bjm ( R_ 190), and checks given for the merchandise didn't
9
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have to be made good immediately~ This was okay with Robw
bins (R. 191). It was the practice of Woods to go to the bank
sometimes t\vo or three times per week (R. 191). The bank
would hold checks until Woods \vas able to cover them (R.
19~2wl99). Most of the time there was not enough 1n the
account to cover the checks (R~ 199). It v~-as his practice to
have the bonded warehouseman ( storekeepcr) make the checks
out, then the de ti very orders and checks would be given to
Robbins (R. 193). \:\Then defendant's agents came to Salt Lake
City ~tcvcry thirty Jays or so'' the accounts had to balance
(R. 201); and they usually did balance (R. 201). Signed
checks w·ere left in the office (R. 207) and were to be filled
in, sometirn es, but not neces sar ily~ by the bonded agent ( R.
206). The last group of delivery orders may have been delivered
in part by Woods and part by mail (R. 2o6) ~

Testimony of Harvey R. JHoorehead.

Moorehead v.r·as
defenJanfs storekeeper at the SaJt Lake City warehouse,
charged 'With the duty of 1naintaining the warehouse and receiving payment for the goods (R. 141). He was also employed
by \X'oods (R. 143) 144). At all times during his tenure as a
storekeeper he had in his possession blank checks signed by
Woods (R _ 144) . It was \XI oods' practice to remove goods
from the warehouse, Moorebead making notes of the numbers

to accumulate a sufficient number to be included in a single

order (R. 146) . The delivery orders sometimes 'vould be taken

by Woods to the bank person.all y and sometimes sent. The
copy of each delivery order was sent to Los Angeles on the

day jc v.,.·as made out (R.

145~

146).

Inventories of the merchandise 1n the warehouse
10
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~vere

made from time to time by both plaintiff and defendant

(R.

146) If defendant's agents discovered shortages they would
I

clear them up and obtain a check (R. 146) ~ but when shortages
\vere discovered by the bankt the bank representative pwould

go directly to Mr. Woods,'' then Moorehead would do what
Woods told him (R. 147). Woods made arrangements with
plaintifFs vice-president~ RobbinsJ to pay for the merchandise
(R. 147).
The signed check maintained in the po5session of Mr.
Moorehead at all times v..~as not actually filled in with an
amount or payee or date until a delivery order ~·as made up

(R. 149).
Woods did some flooring with Refrigeration Distributors
Corporation ( R. 154) During Moorehead's tenure as storekeeper merchandise did not leave· the warehouse without his
knowledge nor were others permitted to enter unless he ac ·
I

companied them (R. 182); and at all times he had a blank

check signed by Woods (R. 183 ). Woods toJd Moorehead that
the bankt through ·Robbinst would give Woods a personal
loan to pay for any goods removed from the '"'a rehouse ( R.
185). Moorehead took orders at times from both Woods and
defendant (R. l86w187).
Counsel for plaintiff cross-examined Moorehead at length
concerning testimony given at a hearing in connection with
Woods~ bankruptcy (R. 153 et seq.). At the prior hearing
Moorehead testified that. the Hshipment date" shown on in·
voices would probably be the date upon which merchandise
\vas shipped from the warehouse (R. 15 5) . Counsel did not
ask the witness ~vhether he v.rould still so testify. Counsel
11
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pointed out that some invoices did not contain a date of
shipment and as ked

v.,T hethe r

he had not testified at the previous

h_earing that the ~~invoice daten would represent also the date
of shipment ( R. 164) The witness answered that if he had
T

said that it Hvlouldn't be right" (R. 164). As to some Inerchand is e the ii 1voices (Exhibits P ·15 through P·19) sho~· ed
on earlier "'shipn1en[ date'! than the date of delivery shown
on the delivery orders (Exhibit P-3).
On redirect 1-foorehead testified that the nshipment date"
\vould mean the date 1nerchandise was Hshipped or transferred,'.
and that it m1ght or might not have been delivered at that
~Tou1d

havc been de1i vered,
possibly all of it, possibly none of if~ (RT 173) ~ When counsel
asked the v.,· itness to ex plain and amplify his testimony at the
prior bankruptcy proceedings the trial judge interposed. lie
indicated that the 'vitness was probably a perjurer, adding that
if th er c v.,ras a varia nee between the \Vi tness' testimony in this
action and that in the- other proceeding a complaint would
be issued (R. 175) Nevertheless~ the trial judge would not
permit counsel to offer evidence which wouJ d explain the
t iJn e. '·Part of the 1nerchand is c

T

apparent difference in the testimony and perforce rehabilitate

the witness. Defen dan t offered to prove that the \\~ i ti 1ess would
testify that in response to a further question by Mr. Hoi brook
at the bankruptcy proceeding, and as part of the same paragraph
in \vhich he had been interrogated as to the meaning of the
in voices~ he had stated, \~' ith re £erence to a gues tion as to the
cliff erence be tv.reen the dates on the invoices and the dates on
the delivery orders that tthe only explanation that I might
give \vould be that they were not taken from the warehouse"
on the earlier date; and that on more specific questioning
t

12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Moorehead had testified that this must be so because the warer

house people made periodic inspections and the goods would
have had to have been in the warehouse. The Court rejected
this offer on the ground that it was !specul.ative" (R. 182).
4

The Exhibits. T\venty-two exhibits

were introduced~ some

primarily formal) others containing substantial evidence of
the course of dealings between the parties~ The documentary
evidence as a \vhole corroborates the picture of the transaction
as drav.rn by the four principal \Vttnesses.
Exhibit P -1 supports the evidence that the warehouse
receipts were being used as security for plaintiff· s extension

of credit to Woods+ T~vo notes representing Woods' indebtedness were dated February 6~ 19 S7. Exhibit P-2 consists of 12
warehouse receipts upon which plain tiff based its action. Ex-

hibit P-3 consists of 5 delivery orders~ one having two pages~
accompanied by 5 checks, all of which contained signatures
of John R. Woods in the appropriate places. It is the me rchan ·
dise listed on these delivery orders of which the plaintiff
claims conversion. The values of the various items are set forth
in Exhibit P -4, being in some instances less than the dec 1a red
value~' shown on the warehouse receipts.
t t

Exhibits D- 5 and D-6~ Vv·hich are printed at length in

Appendixes A, B and C, comprise the only exchange of correspondence between the plaintiff and the defendant relating to
the warehousing arrangement. Exhibit D-5 shoVtrs that on
October 16~ 1956, the vice-president of the pJ aintiff' s lv[urray
branch wrote to defendant that it was the bank~s poJicy that
the goods ,vould ''be paid for at the time they are withdra\vn.''
By Exhibit D- 6 de£ endant informed plaintiff that it interpreted

13
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plaintiffs letter "to authorize delivery from the warehouse
upon the receipt~ by our storekeeper~ of a check for John R.
Woods Company,·· and suggested a long-form agreement under

\Vhich plaintiff could place Jimits upon the quantity of merchandise to be de livered in any one day, fix the pe rcen ta ge of
declared doJla:r value of the merchandise to be delivered and}
an1ong other things, place upon the warehouse company a
contractu ral obligation to mail deb very orders and checks to
the bank \Vi thin a stated period .
.Exhibit P-7 is a standard form of instruction to .storekeepers used by the defendant company, containing instructions
to Moorehead.
Exhibit P-8 consists of 25 delivery orders executed on
various dates bernreen May 21l 1956~ and April 30, 1957.
Fach of these delivery orders contains on

its

face plaintiffs

written authorization for defendant to deliver Jisted merchandise to ''John R. Woods Company,'~ the name under which

John R. Woods did business (R. 189). The back of each
delivery order has been stamped to show the date of its receipt
in los Angeles. This group of delivery orders is enlightening
as to the methods of ope ration of d ef en dan t and plaintiff~ particularly when examined 1n l.lght of Rolfs testimony as to
record~ keeping methods, Robbins' testimony as to plain tiff's
actions \\·tih respect to delivery orders~ Exhibit D~22 (a copy
of the ledger sheets relating to John R. Woods Company's
account in the plain tiff bank) ~ and Exhibit D- 21 (consisting
of 9 checks dra'V't'n by Woods payable to plaintiff in amounts
corresponding to merchandise declared values on various
14
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delivery orders). A swnmary of information contained
these three exhibits is set out as Appendix D.
Exhibits P-9 through

P-13~

and

D-14~ consist

trl

of corres-

pondence or memorandums exc.:ha nged behveen various off iters
and employees of New York Terminal Warehouse Company+
They show a pattern of inspections, inventories and checks
supporting the testimony of Hoi t~ Robbins~ \Voods and Moore~
head. Exhibits P-9 and D-14 should be considered together.
Exhibit D·14 is an audit report relating to an inspect ion of
the warehouse conducted on January 17) 195 7, by T. B. Akeley,
identi£ed as an auditor for defendant; P~9 is an addendum
to it.. The two exhibits show that M r ~ Akeley found some
shortages and overages, that there was improvement since
October 1 7, 1956 (approximate! y the time of the 1etter from
Robbjns to defendant) , that the conditions were corrected,
and that Woods runs the warehouse.n The last fact tends
to cor1oborate Robbins~ statement (R. 220~ 221) tbat upon
finding shortages plaintiff would notify John R~ Woods Company, not the warehouse.. Exhibit P-1 0, a report dated March
27, 195 7) shows that all merchandise in the warehouse was
accounted for as of that date but that some serial numbers
were not in agreement. The report suggests that an adjustment
record should be put through. Apparently this ~ras done~
Compare the delivery order dated April 3rd (part of Exhibit
Q.g) ~ prepared for the purpose of correcting seriaJ numbers.
4

ot

Exhi hit P- 1 1, a co nun unica tion dated February

/j ~

19 57,
contains a comment on the report of January 17 ~ 19 57, and shows
the company's concern with maintaining an efficient warer
house. The writer of the communication suggests rna re~than-
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nonnal risks should be eliminated or the warehouse closed.
It is no ted 1n this report that the \Va rehouse had cons is ten t1 y
checked out

\vi th

respect to inventory. Exhibit P -12 sh o~vs

thas additional checks were being made by the defendant
company as of .February 19) 1957~ and that the company was
requiring the .storekeeper to send inventories and make additional reports on his actions. This exhibit also supports. Holt's
testimony that there \vere no complaints from the bank, and
sh ov.,ls that r el a tionshi ps behveen -plain tiff and Woods v,.r ere
good. Bee au se of the close rela. tionshi p and the appar ent good
stan ding of \Xl oods with the bank it v.ras determined) a ceo rding
to this exhibit~ to close the operation out smoothly 'vithout
requiring the bank to take d cl i very of tb e 1nerchandis e. I c is

noted here, too, that the warehouse company did \~·hat

"\\/as

reasonable for it to do i.e~] watch the "flow of paper'' carefuJ Jy. As can be seen f ro1n Exhibits D-8 and D~ 22, summarized
in Appendix D~ watching the flow of paper might prove to be
unremunerative~ largely because of the plaintiff~s cooperation
V/ i th \V./ oods in the processing of de livery orders. A ceo rding
to Exhibit P-13 ~ on Ma.y 6, 19) 7 ~ defendant sent a communtcation to its storekeeper stopping deliveries from the ware·
house. This is cons is tent with Half s testimony that on May
10, 1957, he \.Vent to Salt Lake Gty to close out the warehouse~
made delivery orders for the five or six remaining items in the
warehouse and gave the delivery order and check to plaintiff.
1

Exhibits P · 1 5 and P -19 are copies of what purport to be
invoices of John R. Woods Company. The significance of these
invoices and their effect upon the course of the trial will be

discussed in Point II of the argument.
16
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Exhibit D-23 consists of three checks drawn by John R~

Woods Company payable to

plaintiff~ dated

May 7, 8, and

10, approximately the same time as the delivery orders of which

the plaintiff complains. The significance of these checks was
unknown to defendant and unexplained by plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The defendant's motion to dismiss the action~ made

at the close of plain tiff~ s case, should have been gran ted.

2. The Court erred in admitting evidence offered by the
plaintiff and in excluding evidence offered by the defendant.
3. In light of all the evidence, the Court's. findings of fact
were clearly erroneous, and its conclusions of law and judgment
contrary to the evidence and against law.

4+ The Court erred in denying the defend.anfs motion
to strike plaintiff's cost bill and in allowing plaintiffs costs~
'
5. The Court erred in denying the defendant's motion
for a new trial.

ARGUMENT
I

THE DEFENDANt'S ]'.lOTION TO DISMISS THE
ACTION, MADE AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFFtS CASE,
SHOULD HA VB BEEN GRANTED.
The plaintiff put on no testimony in support of its case
in chief. Its case consisted solely of facts established by the
17
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pre-trial order and Exhibits P-1~ P-2J P·3~ P-4 and P·7. As
pointed out in the statement of facts these exhibits included
a statement of indebtedness of Woods to plaintiff, t\velve wareA
house receipts issued by the defendant sh O\Vi ng that m erchandisc had been received from Woods for account of plaintiff~
t~'; c deli very orders .sho"'~ing delivery of the merchandise to
\"\Toods~ to get her -...vith five checks drawn by Woods to plaintiff's order) a list of values) and some instructions to

de£endan f s

storekeepec It had been stipulated that the goods " . ere delivered
to a third person or persons by the defendant, thar the dellvery
orders and checks came jnto possession of plaintiff) and that
the checks had not been paid (R. 19).
At this stage of the proceeding there was no evidence that

plaintiff made a demand upon defendant £or
the goods (unless bringing an action for the
merchandise constitutes a demand) , or an offer
warehouseman~ s lien.
There was no ev ide nee

redelivery of
value of the
to satisfy the
that dc]iveqt

had not been made to a person law£ ully en tit led to possession
of the good5~ or his agent. In short, there was no evidence

that defendant had wronged plaintiff.

In putting on its case plaintiff apparently intended to take
technical advantage of the provisions of 72·1-8 Ctah Code
Annotated 1953., which provides:
'·A v.ra reho u seman, in the absence of some la~v ful
excuse provided for by this title~ is bound to deliver
the goods upon a demand rna de either by the holder of
a receipt for the goods or by the depositor) if such demand is accompanied v..rith:
~

1

(

1) An offer to satisfy the

*

*

warehouseman~ s Jien.

*

18
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"In case the warehouseman refuses or fails to deliver
the goods in compliance ~7 ith such a demand by the
holder or depositor~ the burden shall be upon the ware~
houseman to establish the existence of a lawful excuse
for such refusal."

This se-ction of the Warehouse Receipts Act puts the
burden of proof upon the warehouseman in some cases; but
in order for a depositor or the holder of a. receipt to shift the

burden he must show compliance with the provisions of the
act~ i.e., he has

to show demand and tender of the storage
charges. It was so held in N ationaJ Dock and Storage Warehouse Company ·r. United States, 27 F.2d 4 ( 1 Cir., 1928).
In commenting upon the effect of the
of Appeals said:

section~

the Circuit Court

''The District Court was of the optnton that the
provision of Section 15, relating to a demand and offer
to payJ was inserted for the benefit and protection of
the warehouseman, and that~ unless he manifcs ted an
intention at the time the demand was made that it be
accompanied by an offer to pay, he should not be permitted to avall himself thereafter of a failure to make
the offer and escape the burden of proof 'vh ich the
statute imposed upon him. But we do not think that
the mere om iss ion of the warehouseman to request
an offer of payment at the time the demand \vas made
would ex~use the depositor from accompanring his
demand with an offer of payn1ent. The requirement
that the depositor so accompany his demand is a condition to the imposition of the bur den of proof on
the issue of negligence upon the "i;\'arehouseman, and,
unless he has estopped himseJf by his conduct from
insisting upon it, it must be complied with to cast
the burden of proof upon him. n
19

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the instant case~ there is not only no evidence of a
tender of the storage charges~ but no evidence of a. demand
at aiL The instant action can hardly be construed as a demand

for return of the goods s1nce the plain tiff bank, in the first
instance, sued outright far conversion of the goods and at
no time sought or taJked about their return.
, In Dahl ~·. Winter-Truesdell Diercks Compan;·. 62 '1\. D.
351~ 237

N. \Xr. 202 ( 1931.), the Supreme Court of North
Dakota found a pleading bad because the pleader (the depositor) had failed to bring himself within the terms of the
act as to burden of proof. Although the case is primarily
c~nc ern ed -vv· i th a technical rule of pleading, the Court, s construction of the act and its operation to shift the burden of
proof is the same as that o£ the United States Court of Appeals
in the ]\latinnal J)ock and Storage Warehouse case, supra.
Discussing the section of the North Dakota act which is substantially the same as our 72-1-8 Utah Code Annotated 1953,

the Court said:
~ ~ [fhis

J

section qualifies the obligation of the warehouseman to deliver upon demand by saying that he is
bound to deliver ~if such demand is accompanied with:
(a) an offer to satisfy the warehouseman~ s 1ien) and
the fin a 1 paragraph of the section pJ aces the burden of
establishing a Ja ~rfuJ excuse for the refusal to comply
with the demand upon the warehouseman only when
the demand by the holder or depositor is so accompanied.' Clearly~ we think the making of a proper
demand is a condi tlon precedent to the obligation of
the warehouseman to deliver. It is expressly made so by
[the section J~ above quoted.·'
J

t

(The Utah act refers back to . 'such a

demand~ t

20
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inste.ad

of to "a demand so accompanied,t! but the meaning appears
to be _identicaL)
Plaintiff having failed to put on any evidence that the
delivery was wrongfut or that John R. Woods Company "\vas
not the person entitled to the goods or his agent., or that a
demand had been made and refused, or that a tender of the
storage charges had been made, the plaintiff did not establish
a prim a fa c1e case either under the statute or general la 'v. Ac ·
cordingly~

the Court committed err?r in refusing the defendanfs motion for a nonsuit and placing the burden of proof
on defendant. This error not only wronged the defendant
then~ but changed the course of the triaL

II
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE
OFFERED RY THE PLAINTIFF AND IN EXCLUDI~G
EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE DEFENDANT.
During the course of the trial the Court committed prejudicial error by excluding evidence in tv{o instances in v,rhich
it should have been admitted and admitting evidence in one
instance in

hich it should ha vc been excluded.

\V

From the moment the answer \vas filed the issues in the
case included the extent to "rhich plaintiff and John R. Woods
might have had an arrangement between themselves as to
delivery of merchandise from the defendJant's warehouse.
This issue 'vas raised in the first instance in the second defense
of the ansv{er ( R. 1 S) ; and ~· ith reference to it the pre rtr ial
order stated as follows:
21
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HThe defendant clai1ns that the circumstances under
vlhich the delivery was made constituted a contract
implied In fact, and generally lies in the exchange of
cor respond c n ce bet\V een plain tiff and defendant and in
th~ practices of pJaintiff and defendant in reJation to
deliveries and payments under the warehouse receipts.
Part of the practice \~.ras that John R. Woods and H. A.
Robbins, as an agent \\rith power to act for the plaintiff
in connection v.rith the ':varehouse receipts, entered into
an agreement) ()f agreements under "'fh·hich WaJker
Bank and Trust Company did carry John R. Woods
on the basis of his checks) and would ho1d the checks
after delivery of the merchandise until s uc:h time as
;vr r. \X/ ood s was able to obtain other financing under
a ~Roo ring arrangement.' '~
The question is also raised~ inferentially,. in the de£ end ant· s
second contention ( R. 2 0) .

During redirect exam1nation of Robbins the
occurred (R. 127 et seq.):

follo~~ing

As a 1natter of fact~ Mr. Robbins, a good deal
of this time that Mr. Woods was financing through
your bank and using warehouse receipts, he was running
qQ

overdrafts in his account, was he not?
''A

Some of the time.

~·Q

But you were paying checks~ you paid a large
number of checks for him~ did you not, even though
there was no money in the bank ?

''A

We paid a number of checks off.

''Q

You knew how Mr~ Woods \vas financing these
appliances when he sold them) didn ·t you ?

nA

Not always.

nQ \X/ ell~ you kne\V

SOme

Of the tin1e,

didn~t

22
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you?

4

A Wellj rd been told that some of the dealers
fl ooted these units .
l:

.. Q And

what is your understanding of Rooring?

HMR+ HENDERSON: We object your honor, it is

irnma. ter ial.
uTHE COURT: Jt seems to me that it is beyond the
issue of this case~ Mr. Roe! as to what he understood
about Roo ring and how dealers were .financing.
~~MR+

ROE: I would like to make an offer of proof
on it, your honor.

*

*

*

nMR. ROE: I offer to prove by this l\o~itness that he
knew that John R. Woods was flooring the merchandise
that ~ras being held under warehouse receipts and that
he also understood that when wholesalers floored mer~
chandise they delivered it ph ysica] 1y to the property of
the retailer~ from which point he can make additional
financing arrangements with other .fi nancia.l institu
tjons.
w

!tTHE COURT: The offer is refused.''
The Court refused this offer partly on the grounds of
materiality and partly, it would appear from R. 129 aod following, on the ground that since Mr. Robbins previously had
testified differently, further inquiring into the flooring arrangement constitued an attempt upon the part of counsel to
impeach his own witness.

We submit that the Court li\o-·as v.rrong V~-·hichever the
reason. 1"'he method by which Woods dealt \Vith retailtrs~
.and how they obtained additiona] financing to

goods they

pay for the

\vere receiving from Woods---.-since obviously under
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a "Boor1ng arrangement" there must be some lapse of time

between J cl i very and payment--cannot he Ip but be 1nater i aI
in this case; and it is a mis-conception of the ruJ e about impeaching one's O\vn 'vitness to apply it to prevent a party from
bringing: out something inconsistent with what a ,~·itness may
ha,~e said before. As said in .i\-lt"CornJi(k on Evidence, j 38~
the .rule against iinpeachment of one's own \vitness does not
·'forbid the party to bring other evidence to dispute the facts
testified to by his v.,· i tn ess. ,, 0 r, as said in a.nother Horn book~
A'fcK efpey on Et.:idence (5th Ed.) p. 577:
qThere is, however~ nothing in the rule which prevents a party from proving his case in the ordinary
V~t'a y, and, if one witness sV~t·ears to facts 'v hich .it is
necessary for a party to prove otherv.rrise to sLl pport his
case, he may aJways do so~ It is true that the incidental
effect of th ~~ · rs to contra diet his own \Vi t ne5s ~ but this
is not the purpose of the proof, as long as it is material upon issues in the case it is admissable~''

It is apparent from the record that defendant was trying

to obtain a clear st.a tern en t £rom the
The questions asked did nn t

v~~· i tn ess

as direct testimony.
constitute impeachment uncle r

any accepted test. See III Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.),
§ 874 et seq.; 4 Jones on Evidence (5th

Ed.) § 931.

1'he other two rulings on evidence of which defendant
complains occurred during examination of witness Moorehead~
who on direct examination testified generally as to his former
position as defendant's storekeeper, and methods of operation
of the warehouse.

On cross·examina tion counsel

for

the

plaintiff interrogated the witness at length concerning testimony
he had given durJng a bankruptcy proceeding~ particularly
24
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with reference to invoices of John R. Woods Company and
their meaning. The cross-examination was related to the
method of operation of the warehouse, and appeared to be
unobj ectlonable as a basis for impeachment of the witnesS~
The method employed in examining the witness \vas to read
from a. former transcript (R. 153) and ask the witness if he
had so testified on a previous occasion, the Y·/ i tn ess usually
saying he had. Testimony on the previous occasion related to
invoices seemingly showing a sale (and sometimes shipment)
of merchandise to Woods' customers. On the basis of Mr.
Moorehead's statements that he had previously testified in
a certain way~ plaintiff offered in evidence five in voices, Ex·
hi bits P ·1 s through P -19 Defendant objected to introduction
of these exhibits on the grounds that they were immaterial,
.adding, prior to their admission, an additional ground of
objection that the plaintiff had not laid a proper foundation
(R. 165-167). Defendant pointed out that there was no
direct testimony as to the meaning of the invoices~ and it is
clear that the Court understood the basis of the objection
(R. 168, 169) . Defendant agreed to their admission provided
they were introduced sol ely for the purpose of impeaching
the witness~ Plaintiff insisted that the invoices were admissible
both for impeachment and as direct evidence. They were
admitted over defendanfs objection (R. 170).
r

Having introduced the invoices in evidence the plaintiff
terminated cross-examination of the witness and in redirect
examination the defendant attempted to hring out the meaning
of the in voices by direct testimony ( R. 170 et seq.) When the
witness testified, finally, that merchandise \VOU i d not ncccssaril y have been shipped from the vlarehouse on the date
2)
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sho",. n on th c invoice ( R. 1 7 3) the trial judge as much a.s
ca lied the witness a perjurer and threatened him w itb criminal
proscc ution.

Because of the attitude of the trial judge and the seeming
in cons is tcncy between the

witness~

prior statements and his

statements in the present case, defendant sought to inquirE:
further in to the t e ~timon y in the former proceeding by asking
the

V/

i tness questions cone er nin g his fu 11 answers at the other

hearing. Having examined the plaintiff's

copy of the transcript

of former testimony (R. 1 77) defendant's counsel proceeded

as follows:
4

~Q

(By Mr. Roe) Mr. Moorehead, inviting your
attention to the testimony that you gave at the-before
the F edera 1 District Court in the bankruptcy proceeding~ rm going to read you son1c additional questions
and answers from that proceeding and I want you to
tell me if that ~vas your testimony at that time~ .
qA

Yes.

"THE COLRT: Now you refer to pages, 'vill you?
~~MR.

ROE: On page 28. Q (By Mr. Roe) That
qucs tio n cam c after discussing with you some :.erial
nuln ber.s on invoices.
1

H

~You

are correctj that one does not appear; it ap-

pears on this in voice which I \vill show you in a
mornent. Nov.r \vith reference to your previous testimony~ Mr~ Moorehead, can you explain to tbe Court
why we have an invoice here showing a. delivery da.te,
date shipped of 7-11- 56, and your testimony 'vas that
these \\··ere shipped out of the warehouse on that date,
where as they also show a deli very order dated i\.fay 1.
195 7, the identical items

r

q

'A

No~

I can't The

only~-
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minute~ your honor,
"LNo~ I can't.~ The rest

nMR. HOLBROOK: Just a

he
has answered the question,
of
the answer is specutation on his part. He says, ·No~ I
can t, · and that's his answer. Then he starts to specu·
l3:te about that proposition.
1

tj

Following this th c re was considerab1e discuss ion d ur ln g
which the witness ( R. 180) explained to the Court that the
reason he couldn't nexplain to the Courf' the discrepancy
was ··because I couldn ~ t remember specific details concerning
tbose speclfic instances.'·
Counsel for defendant was finally permitted to make
the following offer of proof (R. 181):
,.MR. ROE: The witness ~Tould state that in addition
to saying, 'No, I can't,t that he added: tThe only ex·
planation'~and as .a part of the same paragraph he
added: <:The only explanation that I might give V~t'Ould
be that they were not taken from the v...~archouse on
that date.' I would also offer to prove that Mr. Hol·
brook questioned him more specificaliy on the point
and that thereafter he testified that th i.s must be so
because the "va rehouse peop1e made monthly ins pee
tions or possibly not monthly but periodic ins pee tion~
and the goods would have to have been in the ware&

house.:>'
This offer was rejected by the Court on the ground that
it appeared to be t'clearly speculation." As indicated above,
this ruling came short]y· after the trial judge's statement that,
"if he varies his testimony and doesn't satisfactorily
explain h1s variances to the Court, the Court may be.
lieve that he~s a perjurer. Now you can take your
choice on that because rm not going to have testimony
come into the Court that is contrary to his former
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te.stimony under oath unJ ess it is satisfactorily explained
and if it appears to the Couri there is perjury there

is going to be a complaint issued" ( R. 17 5).
It is subm(tted that these rulings. on the evidence by the
tria I con rt were not only er ron eo u.s but constituted rev ersibie
error+

Clearly the invoices should not have been admitted in
cv id ence, at least not as substantive evidence of their contents.
~'hen

the Court admitted the invoices in evidence there was
meaning~

how they were kept,
or what they were suppo_sed to do. Apparently proceeding to
impeach the witness, counsel for plaintiH asked a number of
questions about former testimony~ But when an objection ~~as
no useable evidence as to their

made to introduction of the invoices on the ground that
there 'vas no proper foundation because no evidence of the
present tes tim on y of the w itne.ss, counsel for plaint 1fl decli n c( I

to ask him any questions about his present testimony; and the
v.ritness v..·as still on the stand. It 1s recognized in Utah and
almost everywhere else tha. t evidence admitted £or the purpose
of impeaching a witness does not constitute substantive evidence of facts contained in a prior statement.
In State v. Chynoweth~ 41 Utah 354~ 126 Pac. 302 ( 1912),
this court said:
hat a \\' itnes s~ ·w·ho
is not a party~ states out of court is not evidence in
chief to prove the fact as stated by him) but can only
be shown to discredit his testimony at the triat~ w·hen
l1 is te.s tim on y is contradicted by such outside staten1 en ts. The effect of proving con trad icto ry statements
extends no further than the ques. tion of cr edl bil i t_r: it
does not tend to establish the truth of the matter em1

~ 1~he

rule j s e Iem en ta.ry that

'\V

2R
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braced in the contradictory statements; it simply goes
to the credibility of the witness~' ~J

The rule as announced was followed in State t.··. Bu-rns. 51
Utah 73~ 168 Pac. 955 ( 1917).
In lt1cConuttk on EvidenceJ § 39, the rule is stated thus:
4

When a \vitness has changed sides and altered his
story or forget5 or claims to forget some fact, and his
previous statement is received for impeachment purposes, \vhat effect shaH be given to the statement a5
evidence? Under the generally accepted doctrine the
statement is not usable as substantive evidence of the
facts stated. The adversary if he so requests is entitled
to an instruction to that effect, and~ more important,
t

if

the only evidence of some eJJential fact is Juch a

prerioNJ Jtatement_. the party} s caJe fails.'~ (Emphasis

added.)
And as said in Morgan~ Basic Problems of Iit·ide~!ce
(American Law Institute) Vol. 1,

p.

70:

nit must, of cour5e) be noted that the prior statement
is not to be used as evidence of the truth of the matter
asserted) if there is a limiting instruction
rIO

See~

also1 58

Am~ Jur+J Witnesses~ § 770.

It is also reversible error, particularly in light of later
developments in the trial, to refuse to permit the defendant
to examine the witness Moorehead further as to what his
testimony was at the previous hearing. The Court had as much
as branded the witness a liar but would not let him show him.self not to be. Where part of a statement of a witness is
relied upon to impeach him, it is obvious the whole statement

should go in J patticu larl y j f there is something in the remai nd e r
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of the statement which qualifies or explains the other testimony.

As said in Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence (American Law
Institute). Vol. 1~ p. 72:
~I F vidence

in denial or explanation of the evidence
of bias, interest, corruption or prior self.contradiction

i.s ev ery~r here admissib1e.'·

And in III Wigmore on Evidence ( 3rd Ed.)
following:

~ 1044~

the

·

't]n accordance with the Logical principle of Relevancy ( ant"c~ 34), the impeached witness may always
endeavor to explain away the effect of the supposed
inconsisten(:y by relating v..•hatever circumstances would
naturally ren1ove it. The contradictory statement in~
d.icates on its face that the witness has been of two
minds on the subject, and therefore that there has been
some defect of intelligence, honesty, or impartiality
on his part; and it is concci vab le that the in consistency
of the statements themselves may turn out to be superficial only~ or that the error may have been based not
on dishonesty or poor memory but upon a temporary
misunderstanding. T·o this end it is both logical and
just that the explanatory circumstances~ if any~ should
be recetved.' ~

s

The right to explain prior statements was recognized
by this cour~ in Hoggan -z-·. Caboon, ·' 1 Utah 1 72~ 87 Pac. 164
( 1906): see atso 4 Jones on Evidence (5th Ed.)., §§ 961, 962.
Moo rchcad was not permitted to e:\:plain, and it is obvious

£rom the trial judge s remarks during the argument of the
case that this made a difference to him as the trier of tbe fact.:l.
The judge believed the invoices meant what plaintiff said tbey
meant~ and he disbelieved Moorehead. That the judge~s erro·
neous admission and exclusion of evidence had a substantial
t
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effect upon his view of the facts is apparent from the following
comments made during the argument:

UTHE COURT: Well, I'm going to let Mr. Roe talk
· about this Exhibit 20 [a summary of the invoices
because the Court is going to take that as meaning
just what it says, that this merchandise \\. as out of
the warehouse months in advance of the time they
even made up their delivery orders.'" (R. 242)

J

*
nTHE COURT;

*
Well~

*

do you \vant the Court to

disregard invoices ?'' (R. 244)

*

*

*

''THE COURT: I will say this:r that under the rule
that binds the Court with re.s pect to the preponderance
of the evidence~ the more convincing evidence seems
to be that merchandise 'vas de iivered months ahead of
the time that delivery orders were made up as applicable to that evidence.. , (R. 2 59)

*

*

*

nTHE COURT: Well, it sounds like fraud. You
people made these up. You said here~ a 'Washerl automatic, Model 232K. v.re are shipping out today~'
the facts were, according to M r ~ Henderson~ that
.same washer was shipped out four 1nonths ago
was sold a half a dozen times in the meantime.'~

262)

and
that
and
(R.

.

*

*

*

~<:THE

COURT: Well, when you rely upon the
written order, then I have to take into --consideration
this evidence with respect to the time of deli very o £
the goods. Now~ I have indicated to you how I feel
about it and I have indicated to you that I am of the
viev.-~ 'that with respect to the time of delivery, the evi-
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dence is more convincing to the Court that the mer~
cl1 an dise \Vas delivered from t h c warehouse 1non ths,
1n advance of the time that the delivery orders ~vere
mad~ up.~' (R. 271)
It is apparent from the foregoing that the judge believed
the invoices and didn~t believe Moorehead. It is also apparent
that this disbelief in the credibility of the v.ritness and the

credence given to the invoices) unsupported by any direct
evidence;- led the judge to view the transaction entirely
d i fi er en tl y than it was vi eVi-T ed by all of the principals to it.
Inasmuch as the invoices were the only evidence that the
merchandise was shipped ·~months in advance, T, their admission
in evidence and the Court's refusal to permit .rehabilitation
o £ !¥1( )0 rehea d, constituted reversible error.

III
1K LIGHT OF ALL THE EVIDENCE, THE COURTtS

FINDINGS OF fACT WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS~
AND ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LA\X' AND JUDG.1\fFJ\'T
CONTRAR'Y TO THE EVIDENCE AND AGAINST LAW+
Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that the trial court, in all action tried upon the facts \vi thou t a
jury~ shall ~-=find the facts s peci ally and state separate1y its
conclusions of la \V." Properly applied) thjs rule would protect
parties in cases tried to the Court from tb e well- kn O\V n practice
o£ deciding a case because of a particular £act and, to gain
approbation) making it appear that all facts \V ere ad verse to
the loser; it waul d tend to permit a reviewing court to deter·
mine (as it can in a jury case) whether a mistaken vie\v of
_12
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the la'v materially affected the judgment. If the findings of
fact are sufficient in this case, our rule serves no useful purpose)
for it is impossibJe to determine \Vhether the judge decided
as he did because of misapplication of the Warehouse Receipts
Act or because he chose to disbelieve the only testimony he
had before him.
In its findings the Court concluded that deliveries by
defendant \vere ¥-~ithout lawful excuse and that defendant is
liabJe to plaintiff for conversion. But to leave no doubt about
the correctness of the decision~ the Court also found

"all is0ues of fact

in

fa \'C)r of plaintiff and against

defendant) including all issues raised in the affirmative
defenses to the complaint and in the pre- trial order] and
~vithout limitation of the foregoing) the Court .spccificaJly finds: that plaintiff made no representations to
defendant, either express or implied by course of con~
duct, or other\\o"i.se, upon \\·hich defendant relied and
\vhich could form the basis 1n fact or in law of any
estoppel or contract implied in fact; * * * ~~
The findings of fact are unintelJigible and self-defeating.
To fail to find a con tract bet~~een plain tiff and def en dan t
shows a misconception of the source of defendant's dutf.

The Court had to find some contract, somewhere. As said
by the Supreme Court of Arizona in Arizona Storage and Dist.
Co. v. Rynning, 37 Ariz+ 232, 293 Pac. 16, 19 ( 1930):
~tThe

reJation of warehouseman and depositor is
contractual in nature. Their duties and obJigations are
reciprocaJ and depend upon their agreement, and, generally speaking) the parties are at J1berty to insert in
their contract any terms and conditions not forbidden
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by Ia ~· or c~n t.ca ry to public pol icy. In effect, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act so provides.~'
See, also~ 56 Am.
Bailments, § 172.

Jur.,

Warehouses, ~ 21~ and 6 Am. Jur.~

With some minor changes the Uniform Warehouse Re-

ceipts Act has been adopted in Utah, appearing as Title 72)
{J tah Code Annotated 195 3. The act places sotn e duties upon

a warehouseman, and J•mits the extent to which he may change
his duties by con tract, but except as 1imi ted by the act a wareho usetnan may contract like anybody else. Some of the re tevant
provisions are summarized below.
first, the act gives permission to warehouseman to issue
warehouse receipts (72~1-1 Utah Code Annotated 195)), and
prescribes that they must embody certain te rrn s. For failure
to include these terms in a negotiable receipt a warehouseman
'"'shall be liable to any person injured thereby for all damages
caused by their omission. The act does not fix a penalty for
failure to include the terms in a non-negotiable receipt ( 72-1-2
V~C.A.

1953).

The right to inc Iude other provisions in a receipt is recogn if.ed by 72-1-3 U ,(_A. 195 3, which provides that the warehouseman may insert any terms and conditions provided they

are not contrary to the provisions of the act and do not impair
his obLigation to exercise due c~re in the safekeeping of the
goods. A non-negotiable receipt, the kind involved in this
action~

is defined by 72·1-4 U.C.A. 1953.

Three sections relate direct1y to the obligation of a ware-

houseman to deliver stored goods. In so far as pertinent to
tbis action they provide:

34
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..
''72-1-8. A warehouseman~ in tht absence of some
lawful excuse provided for by this title, is bound ro
deliver the goods upon a demand made either by the
holder of a receipt for the goods or by the depositor~
if such demand is accompanied with:

.. ( 1) An offer to satisfy the warehouseman's

*

*

·~rn

lien~

*

case the ~·arehouseman refuses or fails to deliver the goods in compliance \\·i th such a demand by
the holder or depositor~ the burden shall be upon the
\varehouseman to establish the existence of a lawful
excuse for such refusal+'~

'·72-1-9. A warehouseman is justified in delivering
the goods, subject to the provisions of the three fo Ito\v1ng sections to one who .is:
n (

1) The person lawfully entitled to the possession

of the goods, or his agent;

'. ( 2) A person \v ho is either himself entitled to
de livery by the terms 0 f a non ne gotia b1e receipt issued
r

for the goods~ or who has written authority from tht:
per son so entitled either endorsed upon the receipt or
written upon another paper; * * * ''
t~72-1-10.

\Vhere a warehouseman delivers the good~
to one who is not in fact lawfully entitled to the pos·
sion of them, the warehouseman shall he liable as for
the conversion to all having a right of property or
possession in the good.s, if he delivers the goods other~
wise than is authorized by su bdi visions ( 2) and ( 3)
of the preceding sectioo.s; and~ though he delivers the
goods as authorized by said subdivisions, he shall be
so liableJ if prior to such delivery he either:

·~ ( 1)

Has been requested~ by nr on behalf of the
person Ia \V f u1Jy entitled to a right of pro petty or posw
session in the goods, not to make such delivery; or,
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1

·~

(2)

Has had information that the delivery about
to be n1ade was to one not lawfully entitled to the
posses5ion of the goodsr'~
The act nov..•here prescribes a means of detcnn.ning the
identity of
the

goods~

H

the person Jav.:full y entitled to the possession of

or his agent,,, leaving this to the common law.

Neither does the act prescribe any formalities necessary to
make a person Hla~vfuUy cntitled.n If the person to whot11
goods 'vcrc delivered ~vas in fact lawfuiJy entitJed to them
the warehouseman has sati s.fi.ed his obligation. The reference

in 72·1- 9 ( 2) to

\V r i tten

.authority does n, t increase but decreases

the warehouseman's burden) for he may be safe in delivering
pursuant to a v.rritten order whether or not the person to

\vhom he delivers is lawfully entitled to the goods. A person

rna y be ··1a \V fully entitled'' because of a con tract betw-een
~·arehouseman

and deposttor; or one between depositor and

third per son; or beea use of superior title.
One of the cases considering the right of a warehouseman
to rely upon a contract with the depositor-not contained in
the warehouse receipt itself-is il1oe v. American Ice and Cold
Slofage Co~npanyJ 30 \X'ash. 2d 51J 190 P.2d 755 ( 1948) ~

This \vas an action against the warehouseman for the market
value of stored .fish. The trial court gave judgment for the
\V arehouseman

and the plain ttff appealed. The judgment was

af1irmed by the Supreme Court of \X1 ashington on the basis of

a contract arising out of oral communications and conduct.
The plain tiff contended that admission of the evidence wa~
improper because in contravention of the parol evidence rule)
but the Supreme Court of Washington held that the pato1
evidence rule did not apply. (It also held that Vl~hcre the pos~
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sesston of the bailee had not been exclusive of that of the
batlor the burden of proof to sho"· the lack of negligence or
lawful excuse did not fall upon the bailee.)
George v. Bekins Van & Storage Company. 33 CaL 2d
834, 205 P.2d 1037 ( 1949) ~ involved the nature of the contract
between the Storer and the warehouseman. In speaking of such
contract the Supreme Court of California said:
~~when

,goods are delivered to a warehouseman for
storage and no warehouse rec:::eipt is issued at time of
delivery~ an implied contract of storage arises containing those terms required by lav..'. If this contract
is to be superseded by the contract contained in the
subseguently issued 'varehouse receipt, it is necessary
that the bailor agree to the written contract as proposed by the bailee. Ordinarily such assent may be
found in the acceptance and retention of the \varehouse receipt by the bailor. * * * By issuing its "'are~
house receipt de£ en dan t proposed the terms to plain tiff
upon \Y hich it Vrt' ou 1d continue to store the goods.
Plaintiff accepted this offer~ and defend.anfs continued
perf or mane e o £ the contract as bailee vl as adequate
consideration to support the limitation clause:~

The intermediate Court in Gearge "l-'. .8ekin s Van &
Storage Company, 196 P.2d 637 (Cal. App., 1948), in upholdthe contents of telegrams between
ing admission of evidence
warehouseman and starer, had said:

or

~·This evidence,

tnoreover, was expressly not offered
for the purpose of varying the terms of the written
warehouse receipt, but w·ent to the issue of Vit·hether
the receipt \\'as the only and entire con tract between
the partie.s +' •
We think it is clear from the case.s and the statute that a
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warehouseman can always shows the terms of his contract with

the sto rer as justification for de1ive ring to a tn ird person. In
the present case the warehouse receipts, Exhibit P-2~ do not
purport to be ·!integrated agreements. ~ There is, in fact~ an
express reference in them to another agreement with the
·~va rehouseman+
t

Another line of cases r e 1evant to the d cc isio n in this case
deals with delivery by a warehouseman to persons ·"lawfully·

entitled,. other\vise than under the warehouseman's contract
Vt~"ith the storer.

Wood

f.

Crocker First J\Tational Bank et air, 107 Cal.

App. 685, 291 Pac. 221 ( 1930) ~ arose out of plaintiffs de·
posit of a valuable tru.nk with Crocker~ which mailed a receipt

to plain tiff. The trunk was deposited in p La {n tiff~ s name, and
she gave no delivery instructions. On N ovem be r 9~ 19 25~
defendant delivered the trunk to the holder of a power of
attorney~ but v{ithout know 1edge of the power~ The depositor
contended that the bank was not justified in delivering because
its officers had no knowledge of the po'"-·er of attorney; further~
that the Warehouse Receipts Act restricts the general power

of attorney and therefore the delivery was unauthorized. After
quoting Mechem on Agency)' § 744~ to the effect that if a
party can prove actual au tho ri ty it is not necessary that he
should have known of it or relied upon it at the time of
dealing v.,rith the agentj the Court had the following to say
'vith reference to the W arehc::>use Receipts Act:
4

Th e further contention of the appellant is to the
etf ec t that this case is con tro 11 ed by the Warehouse
Receipts Act * *
The claim made is that the receipt
I

*.
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issued for the trunk heing non·negotiable~ under sections 8., 9 a11d 10 of said act"' the bank- was negli.~cnt
jn delivering the trunk to Bald\vin Wood. Section 8
deals with the rights of the holder of a receipt; section
9 defines \\'hen a \Vatehousema.n is justified in delivering goods; section 10 deals with the liahility of a
warehouseman for the wrongful delivery of good~.
Without discussing the authorities cited, we are satisfied that, if said act a pplles in cases of this class~
section 9 of the act is contrary to the appeiJanfs claim.
So far as material, said section reads: 'A warehouseman is justified in delivering the goods subject to the
provisions of the three follo\ving sections~ to one \vho
is- (a) The person lawfully en tit 1ed to the possession
of the goods~ or his agent, (b) A person who is either
himself entitled to delivery by the terms of a nonnegotiable receipt issued for the goods~ or who has
written authority from the person so entitled either
endorsed upon the receipt or written upon another
paper.' As said by counsel for defendant in his brief:
'It is obvious that Mrs~ Wood v{as a person lav..;fully
entitled to the goods. It is obvious that Baldwin Wood
was her agent. It follows that the bank v.ras justified
in dellvering the trunk to Baldwin Wood~ the agent
for Mrs. Wood. The statement of the proposition
proves itself.~ Nowhere do we find anything in the
said Warehouse Receipts Act that negatives this conclusion.'1

In Trar-ers v. Burdge et

at.,

101 K. J~ 237~ 127 AtL 191

{ 1925), the defendant had received goods in storage from
plaintiff and given a non~negotiable 'varehouse receipt. There-

after, the defendant delivered the greater part of the. goods
to Brookland Furniture Company by virtue of two chattei
mortgages made by plaintiff. It v/as admitted during trial that'
the goods delivered were covered by the mortgages and that
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payments vlcre in default at time of deJivery. The mortgages

contained the usual provision that in event of default of the
stipulated pa ym en ts the company should have the right to
retake and sell the goods~ but no formal process was sued
out by Brookland furniture Company. The Court of Errors
and Appeals affirmed the holding that the warehouseman \vas
not liable, citing the Warehouse Receipts Act as au tho rit y
for the 'va.rehouse1nan~s ju.stification in delivering to the person
en tit1ed to the possession of the goods, or his ageq.t.
In Bunnell v. Ward et ai.J 241 Micb~ 404, 217 N.W. 68
( 19 28) , a ne gotiab] e ~rarehouse receipt had been issued to

a partnership by a. \varehouse company. Thereafter, although

the receipt was not surrendered, the warehouseman delivered
goods to one of the partners~ The Michigan Supreme Cou~t

ruled that a partner was lawfully entitled to delivery of
par tn ers.hi p goods~ therefore the deli very w a:s justified under
tbe act.
Farmets' Union Warehouse Compan;: z... Barnett et al.,
214 Ala. 202, 107 So. 46 ( 1926) ~ involved a situation in which
the plaintiffs had deposited cotton with defendant for which

clefendant issued n egotia bl e receipts. In upholding the right
of the defendant to deliver to a holder of a paramount title
the Court said:

"CJ.earJy no change as to the former ru1€ could be
inferred fro1n such language, but rather a recognition
th€rcof. The argument of counsel) rcduc€d to its tast
analysis, .scc1ns to be tl1at the ~varehouseman is liable
in any and every case Vi here de Iivery is made without
a production of the recti pt ~ regard Jcss o £ whether the
rccei pt i5 ne go tiab 1e, or, if so~ whether or not it has
40
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in fact been negotiated. But the statute does not so
provjdel and if so intendedj it would have been a simple
matter to have been so expressed; * * *
~~Our

attention has not been directed to any authority
cons truing a similar statute to the contrary to this ho1d ~
ing, and we do not think the legislative intent was to
work a change in the rule in a case as here presented.
Indeed~ the lawmaking body deemed it necessary t(~
specifi call y p rov ide for 1iab ili ty o £ the ·warehouseman
for delivery of the goods \vithout taking up the receipt
therefore, when such receipt had been negotiated to the
purchaser in good faith.~'
We submit that if the trial court had correct ty vie"':ed the

law it would have had to find that defendant de11vered to a
person nlawfuJJy entitled" to possession. The evidence is all
one way. We are a~rare that a trial court's findings, particularly
in a law case, more often than not are held to be unassailabJc.
But the invincibility of findings is usually confined to cases
in \v hich there is a conflict in the evidence and ··substantia I''
evidence to support them.
An appellate court is not bound by the conclusions of a
trial court based upon undisputed facts. See King ~·. Buckeye
Cotton Oil Company 155 Tenn. 49lt 296 Sr Wr 3~ 53 A+L.R.
1086 ( 1927); Los Angeles lnveJitrtent Company v. Home SaPings Bankj 180 CaL 601, 182 Pac 293~ 5 A.L.R~ 1193 ( 1919);
Klatt v~ Akers 232 Iowa 1312] 5 h~.w~ 2d 60S~ 146 A.L.R.
808~ and Picerne v. Redd, 72 R. L 4, 47 A.2d 906, 166 A~L.R.
1

1

397 ~ Under our constitutional provision (Article VIII) Section
9) this Court has, of course, been required to give great weight
to the findings of the trial court in a law case. But even under
this provision the Court has usually [n die a ted that it will accept
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the findings of the tria] court if the .. evidence is conflicting,' .

or if there is nsubstantial" evidence to support it. See Pixton
t-'. Dlinn~ 120 ljtah 658~ 238 P.2d 408 ( 1951); and Idaho State
Bank l-'. Hoope-r Sugar Cornpany, 74 l:tah 24~ 276 Par. 659

( 1929).
There ":ere certain facts in this case that the trial court

had to find. It had to ftnd a con tract between the plain tiff and
the defendant-and it should have found V~-·hat the terms of
that contract

\V

ere. In finding the terms the Court caul d not

reasonably .lJ;;nore the correspondence" betw-een pl.a1ntiff and

defendant in October and Nove~nber 1956 (Appendixes A,
B and C). Although the trial court indicated that it did not
intend to folJow the rule "'that silence g1ves consent, . , it should
have. ln the recent case of V-1 Oil Cornpany v. Anchor Petrol ~u;n Company, 8 Utah 2d 349, 334 P .2d 760 ( 1959), this
Court approved the view that one party may not permit another
to believe that the contract has. certain terms and tb en later
refuse to be bound by tho5e te rm.s. As said in that case ~thad
defendant desired to make it clear that tbe conditional accept~
a nee by p Jain tiff of defend an f s off c r was unacceptable it
v.ro u1d have been a simp Je m attcr to have replied to plain tiff's
l

letter of Septemer 6th rejecting the same." It \vould have bet?

a simple matter for the plain tiff in this case to ha. ve rep lied
rejecting the defendant's construction of ~-=payment.~' Plaintiff
did not rep 1y, and whether it did or not is of little consequence
since the in te rp ret a tion adopted by the defendant \vas accepable to plaintiff and there was, in fact, a "tmeeting of the
minds." As said in 3 Corbin on ContfaCJJJ Section 538. "'"if the

defendant admits that he gave the same meaning to the words·
as did the p 1ai n tiff) he should not escape liability by convincing
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the Court that no reasonable man in his place \vould have given
the v.-·ords that meaning and that no reasonable rna n in the
other party s place would have expected him to do so.'~ It is
clear that as of the date of receipt of the November 12 letter
by plain tiff there v.,· as a con tract bet \\:een plain tiff and defendant
under \vhich defendant was to deliver merchand~se to Woods
upon receipt of Woods~ check by the storekeeper. 'This fact
•s borne out not only by the exchange of cor respondence but
by the testimony of Holtt Woodsj 1foorehead, and Robbins.
There wasn~t any other evidence on this point. Was the trial
judge free to dis believe ?
1

Following the exchange of correspondence~ for a period

of approximately six tnonths the parties operated in accordance
with such an understanding, much as they had done before
that time. There \vas no obligation on the part of the defendant
to receive a signed order from plaintiff prior to delivery of
any goods; no obligation to insure that the check would be
paid; no guaranty that there \vere funds \Yith which to pay it.
The t es timon y of both l\.1 oo r ehead and \X/ ood s ~·as that
a signed check was left with

~'oods

at all times and that the

storekeeper had authority to fill in the blanks on the check
and deliver to the bank. That the check \vas not cotnp1ete,
and that the star ek eeper for bookkeeping simplicity might have
found it convenient, as he testified, to a.ccumuiate a number
of items be£ ore preparing a deli very order and sen ding it to
the bank, did not prevent the action of the storekeeper in
obtaining a check before delivery from amounting to substa_ntial performance of defendant's obligations under its contract
with plaintiff. The negotiable instruments law makes it clear
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that the taking of in com pI eted instruments by the storekeeper
Y./ as

compliance under defend an f .s contract with the bank. It

ts provided in 44-1-15 L~ .C.A. 19 53 as follows:
4

~\X' here

an instrument is o,vanting in any material

part icu Ia r the person in po sses.s ion thereof has p-rim a
fa c.- ~~c.- authority to complete it by filling up the blanks
therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered by
the person making the signature in order that the
paper rnay be converted into a negotiable instrument
operates as prim a facie a utbority to fill it up as suth
for any amount. *

**"

·

And 44·1·13 U.C.A~ 1953 provides that:

''An instrument is not invalid for the reason only
that it is antedated or postdated; provided~ that this
is not done for an illegal or fraudulent purpose. The
person to whom an instrument so dated is delivered
acquires the title thereto as of the date of delivery~t•
The evidence 1~ thus clear~ based upon the testimony of
the four principals ~ nJ the documents, that the bank received
substantially \\-'hat it bargained foL The \\··arehousetnan de~
livered the goods as Woods n ccJed them in his business and
took in exchange Woods' checks. lt is no answer to say that
one or more checks may have been postdated:t or not completeJ~
or delivered in blank~ It rs no answer to say that the storekeeper
rna y have held the checks for some time before d eiivering
thcrn to the bank. These things bear upon ~~hether the warer

ho usern an breached other o bl iga tions of its con tract with
plaintiff-but it would be

\V riting

a new and different con tract

to hold that authority to deliver was conditional upon them.

Perhaps defendant breached a contractual duty v:hen it did
not trans1nit delivery orders and checks on a daily basis;
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perhaps it 'vas a breach to take post-dated checks; but to find
a breach does not solve the problem. This contract contained
a number of promises, a grant of authority~ and a number of
conditions. The authority granted was to deliver property to

Woods. Admittedly the authority was conditional. But~ considering the undisputed evidence, what 'Nas the .substance of
the condition? The evidence compels a tinding that plaintiff
\\'anted a Woods check) but that it didn't care about much
else-\vhether it \vas given immediately before or after delivery~
or whether Woods had money in the bank. Appendix D j5
a sun1 mary of the t r ansae tions as based upon the dates of
the delivery orders~ the dates they were received in Los Angeles~
the period of time during \Vhich the bank held \\1ood.s' checks
and the instances in which overdraft.s in the .account \vere
honored. Plaintiffs conduct during the period belies its contentions now. Appendix D alone negatives any conclusion
that defendant materially breached its contract~ or materially
breached the condition upon which de] ivcry was author1 zed.

Nat every breach of contract i.s a breach of condition.
Admittedly defendant may be held liable to plaintiff fo1
damages resulting £rom any breach. But if it

ere suing for
breach o£ con tract plain tiff would have to s.hov..· that .it suffer cd
Vtt'

a loss because of the breach; it would have to come forward
and explain its h andJ 1ng of the John R. W ood.s account and
tell w by, during the period in v.r hich it \vas J ish on o ring
checks drawn in pa}'ment for stored goods, it

~Tas

paying itself

on other checks made by John R. Woods in an amount in excess
of $4700.00 (Exhibit D-23), and payil"lg others in amounts in

excess of $1500.00 (Exhibit D-22).
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If the problem is viewed as one involving the extent of
defendant's au tho rit y to deliver, de£ en dan t was, · _under the
circumstances, authorized[() deliver. See Restatement of Agencj'~
§~ 33, 34. If viewed simply as a contractual problem, there

V./as no material breach of defendanf s duty to plaintiff. See
ReJtt:ttement of ContractJ, §~ 263t 274~ 275.
Regardless of plaintiffs agreement with defendant, Woods
Vias a person ~ 'la\V fully entit led, or his agent·:> under his agree~

Woods himself testified that Robbins.
agreed that he could take the goods out and use them in his
business as a mere handise jobber~ whether or not he cou1d
pay for thetn immediately. He was to have the goods by asking
for them. Woods, Robins and Moorehead aJl bear this out.
Moreover, it is apparent that the plaintiff and Woods worked
the proposition together and that plain tiff retained some joint
control of the "':arehouse. \Vben the plaintiff discovered shortage.s in the \varehous e Robbins pointed them out to Woods,
not to the storekeeper nor to de£ endant' s Los Angeles off ice .
AlJ this, and the conduct inferrable from Appendix D, show
that John R. Woods was lawfully entitled from the standpoint
of an agreement betv..Teen him and the plaintiff, or \vas the
men t v..r ith the bank.

plaintiffs

agent~

In any event, p1aintiff v.r~ as estopped from claiming that

the deliveries to Woods \ve r e- u n la 'v ful. The tria i court imputed
kno\vledge of Woods' books and accounts to the defendant
storekeeper and conc]uded that the defendant ·\vas charged.
\vith that kno\vledgc. ErgoJ defendant cannot sho'v ''"good
faith" reliance. We submit that all of the elements of an
estoppel were present. There \vas some kind of an arrange-
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ment between Woods and plaintiff; defendant's storekeeper
knew about it; defend ant~ s storekeeper suspected that Woods
was not in good financial condition; notwithstanding th1s suspicion and notwithstanding the drawing of checks more or
less indiscriminately, all checks drawn by the sto rekee per or
by Woods in connection ~vith the removal of goods from the
defendant~s \varehouse were in fact honored by plaintiff ur1bl
the first \veek in May~ 1957; plaintiff continued to let the
store keeper (defend an f s eyes and ear 5 on the scene) believe
that everything was all right, dealing directly with Woods
upon discovery of shortages. It \vou1d be improper for the
Court to isolate the know ledge of one of de fendanf s agents
for the purposes of determining the extent to \V hich de fen dan t,
a corporation~ relied upon the conduct of plaintiff. It is undisputed that the corporation tried to protect itself through
reports and periodic inspections and inventories of the 'varehouse, but plaintiff made the de fen dan f s record keeping considerably more difficult and less rewarding through the honor~
ing of no- fund checks~ the holding of checks and delivery
orders, and the giving of notices to John R. Woods when dis~
crepanc1es were found in the vi:arehouse. "The defendant as
a whole~ as a corporation~ no doubt would have taken additiona I
steps to protect itself had it not been led by pJainti.ff to beJieve
that the method .ln ~~hich the \Varehouse was being operated
\vas sa tis factory. P Jain tiff as much as to1d the storekeeper that
·it would dea 1 directly with Woods w .lth respect to discrepancies
-discovered in the warehouse. (See LarJen v. Knightj 120 litah
261 ~ 233 P.2d 365~ 372 ( 1951); and cf Heaton et al. t·. i\1a-rtlnez~ 3 (;tah 2d 259, 282 P ~2d 833, 835 ( 1955).
The fact recital is based upon the testimony of the four
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principals and the documents in evidence. But the Court "''as
thro,vn on the v.rrong scent and follo'h·ed five invoices avlay
from the hunt. The invoices \\.'ere accepted
sho~ring

by the Court as

JeJ iveries out of the warehouse ··months in advance''

of issuance of delivery orders for the same merchandise by
Moorehead as s b) rekee per. As prev i( lusl y pointed out, admission of the invoices ~~as improper since their lncaning., purport
and val1dity haJ not been established. Hut assuming their
admis.sion v..Tas proper~ they stilJ do not prove what the trial
COLlrt took them to prove. The testimony reJating to them \vas
that the date shown as "shipmenf~ date on the invoices \vas
not necessarily the date of shipment from the warehouse, and
that \vhere no shipment date 'vas shown, the invoice date would
not be th c .shipment date. ( ~loo rehead tes ti:fi ed that if he had
.said in a p rev iou.s hearing that the invoice date represented
the shiptnent date he would have been wrong.) But by com~
pa r1 n g the in voices w i tl1 eacb other, and with the warehouse
rcc-c i pts~ it 1s a p parcn t that t be invoices prove nothing. Appendix
E is a table prepared by comparison of serial numbers of
various items found on invoices with those found on other
invoices~ and with the ~Tarehouse receipts. If Invoice A w·as
correct~ B \Vas incorrect; and

if either

th c goods were shipped out before they

··v..t as correct~
\Vt

some of

re received in the

\\.'arehouse in the fir.st place. l\.1oreover, the invoices are un·
believable when compared \vtth other evidence as to inspections
and the method of handling delivery orders and reports.
Inspection reports sh OVv~ that the goods were all ac<:oun ted for
as late as M a reb 27 ~ 19 57 (plaintiffs Exhibit P- 1 0) . 1'he
report of January 17, 1957, and the testimony of Holt and
Robbins as to 1nspections deprive the invoices of all \\··eight.
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IV
THE COURT ERRED

l~

DENYIT'\'G THE DEFEND-

ANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFtS COST HILL

AKD IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFF'S COSTS.
Rule 54 (d) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides as follows:
ttA party \vho claims his costs rnust w·irhin five days
after the cnt ry of judgment serve upon the advcr~e
party against 'vhom costs are claimed and file \\'ith the
Court a verified memorandum of the items of his cost
and necessary disbursements in ·the action or proceeding .stating that to affiant's kno~vlcdge the items are
correct, at1d that the disbursements have heen necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding~ A party
dissatisfied "i;Vith the costs claimed, may~ \\'ithin five
days after service of the memorandum of costs file a
motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the Court
in which the judgment was rendered.~'
The record .shO"\\'S that the judgment was entered on ApriJ
30~

1959 (R. 280), and that on 1\1ay 5~ 1959~ an unverified
~~Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements" was filed br

plaintiff (R. 284). On May 6, 1959, the defendant moved for
an order striking the Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements
on the ground that it had not been verified. Thereafter~ on
May 11~ 1959, after the period within which the original
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements might have been
filed under the rule, plaintiff moved. for leave to file a supplemental memorandum on the ground that the one theretofore
filed contained errors arising from oversight or omission. On
June 5, 1959, the Court entered an order denying defendanfs
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motion to strike the cost bill but taking no action upon plaintiffs
motion to nJc a supplemental bilL
This Court, in Houghton v. Bartonj 49 Utah 611, 165
Pac. 4 71 ( 1917)) stated that there must be at least a substantial
com pli ancc with th c requirements of a former secti O!ll much

like Rule 51 (d) ( 2) ; and the Court has been strict in cons t r u ingr o the; r eq uiremen ts relating to cos t5. For in sta nee~ in
1\1elson I-'. ArrouJhead Freight Lines; 99 Utah 129~ 104 P.2d
225 ( 1940) ~ it was held that a cost biH which did not reach
the Clerk~ s office until the sixth day after verdict) although
mailed on the fifth day} should havc been s tr ic:ken. Our rule
is explicit in requiring the Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements to be ve riE ed~ and the filing of an unverified one

is not substantial compliance.

v
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDAN1~·s MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
On May 11, 1959, the defendant moved for a new trial~
partly on the ground of ne""· ly discovered evidence which should
not ha vc been discovered before triaL The evidence was, sub-

stantially, that Superior Heating and Appliance Company, the
purchaser to whom most of the shipments were sho~rn to have
been made on the John R~ Woods invoices, was a company
controJicd by John R~ Woods~ indicating that it would ha,.-e
been pas si ble to sh ovl shipments to this company without
n1 aking any physical change of the goods from the warehouse.
Although defendants recognize that this relates to a col-
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lateral matter, we believe that denial of the motion for a new
trial in this case was an abuse of discretion beea use of the
fact tha. t the in voices, as a pp eared from the record, had a substan tial effect on the outcome of the case; and under defendant· s
theory this could not have been anticipated.
The trial court knew that its view of the facts \vas infl•J-

enced primarily by what it took the invoices to mean. When
it had an opportunity to reconsider the invoices, and receive
new evidence that the invoices did not mean any such thing~
indicating that the remainder of the evidence---coherent~ con~
sistent and compelling belief, without the invoices-was correctj
the trial judge should have. granted the mo.tion. This is particularly true in light of the other grotmds for a ne\v trial
pointed out to the trial court, i.e.~ the error in admitting the
invoices in the first place, the refusal to perm it d ef end a11 t
to sho"v plaintiff~s knowledge of Woods' arrangements with
his retail dealers, and the ref usa i to penni t d ef en dan t to
rehabilitate the witness Moorehead~

CONCLUSION
Insofar as the merits of the case go, the evidence prohibits

recovery by plaintiff in an action for conversion. The tria.l
judge was wrong unless defendant not only had the burden
of proof but the judge was free to disbelieve all the persons
who had first- hand knowledge of the transactions. The tr 1al
judge seemed to be influenced primarily by the invoices and
the fact that the defendant maintained a warehouse on the
premises of the debtor~ Woods~ and empl eyed a person there~
tofore and sometimes thereafter in the employ of Woods~
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Hut the Court failed to reali1e that this is a .fairly standard
practice \vith reference to field warehousing arrangements such
as this. See 1To1n Bny Stores,. Inc. r:. Douglas-Guardian Ware~

houJe (.'orporatir;nJ 23 7 Mo. App. 892,

179 S.W. 2d 145

( 1.944); and Bradley t-'. St, Louis Tenninal Warehouse
fhoJ_l', 189 f.2d Hl8 (8 Cir., 1951).

Cnn~

De fen dan t, as a service to plain tiff and Woods, rna in tained
a \\'are house on \X' ood s ~ pr etni se.s. P la1n tiff knew ,~.here the
\'--'arehouse was and that Woods \vould be there operating a.:;

a

ho Jc saJ er of goods. The proof shov..rs, indeed, that plain bff
p.a rti ci pa ted to a n1 uch larger extent in Woods' activities than
Jid defendant or any of its agents. The bank \vas in on things
frorn the beginning. It knew· ,..vhat Woods \\-'as doing and
ho'A-' he '"-ras operating in the warehouse. It kept a constant
ch~ck on him; and when it found something wrong> Woods
\\. a :i told about o t. Only the defendant ~ras kept in the dark.
Vtt'

1~he

Court had to believe the clef end ant· s evidence because

the de fen dan t produced all of the principals to the transaction;
there ~Tasn't really anyone eJse left to testify. There being no

confl.ic t but plenty of corroboration in the evidence, it vlas.
the duty of the Court to accept that evidence. It ha.d to find
there 'vas a contract; it had to find that there was substantial
performance by defendant; it had to find an arrangement
between the plaintiff and Woods under \\.'hich Woods was
authorized to pick up the goods to give the b.ank a check for
them "v hether he had funds or not. And a.t that) the evidence
in defendant's behalf might have been stronger than it ~·as.
The Court refused to hear what plaintiff knew about the kind
of arrangements Woods as a wholesale appliance dealer ~·as
making with his retailers.

52
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Court also erred in admitting the invoices in ~vidence.
There \vas no direct evidence as to what the invoi(es mea~t)
only statem en ts about prior sta tern ents elicited from lV[oo rehead on cross-examination) and which could not be used as
proof of the substantive facts contained in prior statements.
[ v en thenl admission of the invoices would ·not have been
so unpalatable if the Court had not attributed to them a validity
and a meaning unwarranted by their o~· n inconsistency and
all of the other £acts of the case+ To ''believe the invoices,
the tria 1 court must have dis be1ieved all of the other evidence.
Holt testified consistently that the de£en dan t company tnade
regular checks of the warehouse and physically counted the
stocks then on hand; Moorehead said they did; Woods said
they did; Robbins said the bank~ too) checked the serial numbers
but discovered short$.ges only once in awhile~ (In light of
this disbelief perhaps the Court did no harm in not permitting
rehabilitation of Moorehead since it felt free to disregard
testimony whether a witness· s credibility 'vas sullied or not.)
1

•

Since no allowance ~vas given to defendant for any of the
disputed deliveries~ the trial court must also have disbelieved
Holt~ s undisputed, corroborated testimony that on May 10~ 195 7)
he found 5 or 6 units in the warehouse, made a delivery order
for them~ obtained a check from Woods and sent the check .and
delivery order to the bank~else how was defendant a converter of those units ?
The trial court made at Jeast three reversible errors in
its mUng upon the evidence; another in placing the burden of
proof upon the defend ant. N ot'v ithtanding these errors) the
defendant met the burden of proof 'vith more evidence than
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v.ra5 necessary; but the Court disregarded the evidence and
even found all facts in favor of the plaintiff and against the
de£ endant \X' e be Iieve it is cJ ear that the trial court either
misunderstood the Jaw or disregarded the purport of uncontradicted evidence in the case. The judgment should be reversed
and the Court directed to enter j udgrnent for the defendant~
no cause of action~

Res pectf u11 y submitted,
Bryce E. Roe
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continenta I Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1~ Utah

Attorneyr fnr Defendant and Appellant

54
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

APPE:t\~DIX

A

FIRST MURRAY BRA0.rCH
~-fur ray 7, Utah

October

16~

1956

H. A. ROBBINS
Vice P resident- Manager
New York T c:rrn [nal Warehouse Company, Inc.
5 20 West Seventh Street

Los Angeles

14~

Cat if ornia
Attentjon: Mr. Jack Holt

Gent]emen:
We are presently financing aga•nst your v..~arehouse receipts for
the John R. Woods Company, Salt Lake City, Utah. These receipts
cover appl1ances! and it is our method of operation that these units~
-one or more] be paid for at the tjme they are w ithdta \Vn.
Th!s is to advise you that this is the manner in which 'V~/C will
handle a11 tran5action s which we presently have or may have in the
future.

/s/ H. A+ ROBBINS
H. A. Robbins
Vice President-Manager
HAR:ec

CC: John R. Woods Company
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APPENDIX B
NEW YORK TERMINAL WAREHOUSE

CO~

) 2 0 West Seventh Street
Los Angeles 14~ California.

November 12, 19)6
Mr. H. A. Robbins~ Vice President
Walker Bank & Trust Company
1-lurray 7; Utah
Dear Mr_ Robbins:
I have been a way f tOffi the city most of the time for the past th (ee
Vitceks and apologize for being so late in answering your letter: of
October l6t h, relat ~ ve to de1ivery of goods from our Warehouse J\To.
2552-2 operated for John R_ Woods Co.
I asked M r _ Wood_~ to arrange v..:ith you the method of de1ivery
which you wanted to authorize of material from the warehouse under
the warehouse receipts w hkh you are holding~ and f corn you ( let tcr
interpret that you w i:sh to authorize deli very from the warehouse upon
the rccc-i pt~ by our Storekeeper! of a check f rotn John R. Woods Co.
I am at t a( h 1n g for your inspection, and mod. i fication if you so desire,
an out Iine of Deli very Instructions which are of ten tendered to u:s by
ware house rccc i pt holders for the deJ i very of goods from our ware-.-

houses.
T I hi n k you wIll fi n (J that the i nst ructions as outlined gjve protection
to both the ·warehouse company and the Bank and set definite limits:
on the operation of the warehouse. W c would 1ike very much to have
our de 11 very instructions from you in somewhat the out lined form,. in
tr j p 1icate. Please nnde rstand that we can and wi 11 operate within any
lim its that yolt set.
If you have any questions, as to this or any other phase of the operat ~on! do not hesitate to v;,rr ite to us.

Very truly yours:.
I nco rpo rated
NEW YORK TERMINAL WAREHOUSE
js/ C. J. HOLT
C. J. liolt
Vke President
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CO~

APPENDIX C
(Bank Letterhead)
N tv.' York Terminal Warehouse Companr ~ Inc:.
~20

West Seventh Street

Los Angeles 14., California

Date ..... ·-·····························
GentJemen:
To secure certain loans made and to be made by the Walker Baok
&. Trust Corn pany (he reinaf t cr sometimes ref erred to a..~ the "Storerro) ,
the Storer bas and will pledge to the Bank non-negotiable warehouse
receipb evrd~nc:Eng the storage of appli;) nces. \X' e understand tha.t
these items wilf be held in your Warehouse No. 25)2 at 52) West
1st Sou thJ SJ.l t Lake City t Utah. Other 1ocat1onst ho\vever! Jnay be
utjlj2ed as necessary.
These Instructions are your au thor ity to deljve r to the Storer f ron 1
it~ account

such merchandise stored in the Bank's name and held for
the fo! low[ng described goods subject to the conditions and
oudined herein.
goods~

rcstrktion~

aw

in
one day . having a total dolJar
value of $ .. _..... _.. __ . _... _.. _.. based on values as shown on yon r
v:.~arehouse receipts .andjor your rtcciving record on which the
warehouse receipt is based.

l. You

may dellver

by you under the provi ..
sions of these instruct!ons=' the John R. Woods. Company is to
tender to you it~ check dra~:n on and payable to Walker Bank
& Trust Company in an amount el:lual to ........ % _________ .. of
the declared dollar Value of the mer(handise to be delivered.

2. Prior to any rdease of inventor}"" made

3. This check, together with your regular delivery order form
(in duplicate) on which is to be listed the particular goods
delivered~ together with reference to the Warehouse Ret€ i pt
number, or n 1unbers! under which it was stored! and other
pertj nen t descriptions are to be m:a iled via United States First
Class Ma 11 by a representa t ivc of the New York Termina 1
Warehouse Co.; on the same day which it i.s rccei v cd. It 1s
agreed that you shaH have no further liability -in connection
with such checks or the value thereof. The depos[tj ng in the
United States Mails as outlined above shall automatitall y reinstate you t authority to d eJ iver to John R. W ootls Company,
subject to the limitations set forth above. This Del1very Order
in duplicate (one copy to be retained by us) we agree to execute
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and return to you promptly at 52 0 West Eeventh Street, los
Ange le s, Cal if ornia~ if com plcte and in proper order.
4. Th [s authority to de Ii ver merchandise shall not give to the

John R. Woods Company~ any .right) tit 1e or i ntcrest in or to
any of the merchandise in satd Vitarehouse stored in our name
and for our accounl except as noted above and subject to the
various restrict-ions and s.ti pu lations as outlined herein.

5. You wi Il not permit any charge for aoy reason w hlch may
be or become a lien on the mer-chandise cove red by your Ware·
house Receipt or Receipts and held by us to remain unpaid
longer than .}0 ~ays af tcr the end of the month in whrch such
charges accrued::' unless you shall immediately notj fy us .as to
such unpaid cha. rges in each instance.
6. These instructions executed by us in triplicate shall become
cffccti ... c only upon your deli very to us of a duly executed. copy
hereof signed by one of your off icets evidencing acceptance
of the provisions {Onta ined therein. Upon becoming effective~
the~c instructions shall supersede alJ previous instructions and
shal I .remain in fuJ J force and effect unti 1 amended or cancelled
by the bank in writing.
Please acknowledge receipt of and agreement to these conditions by
signing and retu.r n i ng the attached car bon copy of this letter.

Sincerely yours~
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.L..I'..n&....J.YDR1

Delivery Orde-t

Number
1001
1002
1003

:S-21-,6
7·17-56
7·17-56
7-19-56
9-12-56
9-18-56
9-18·56
9-19-56
10-16-56
10-17-56
11- 7-56
11- 9-S6
11-21-56
12~ S-56
12- 6-56
12- 6~56
12- 7-56
1- 9-57
lr17•57
1-21-57

1004
1005
1006
1007
1008
1009
1010
1011
1012
1013
101.-i
v.

\0

101j
1016

1017
1018
1019
1020

2-14-)7

1021
1022
1023
1024#

1025
1026
1027
1028
1029
1030

Date

2-21wS7
3-11-57
4 ·3-S7
4~30·57
j- 1-57
5~

2-5 7

S- 3-57
5~ 7-S7
5-10-57

*Io di(ates overdraft.

# 1024

'-'"·~~U"\.....~·-

Check

Amount
$ 184.45
2962.15
548.00

573.00
822.00
2923.63

1596.75
303.60
527.35
3372.30
1271 ...JO
2226.45
134.3)
1465.00
2713.80
1282.05

1040.35
734.3)
1072.10
1389.70
935.60
1635.10
1101.05
1 J 6'1.80
685.00
822.00
965.00
1507.00
6814.30
628.70

Date
Unknown

Date Charged

Amount
To Account
$ 184.45
'-23~,6

Unknown

3510.15

7-23-56

Unknown

573.6o
822.00

8- 6-56

Unknown·

9~21-56

Unknown

4520.3)

10-10- )6*

Unknown

303.60
527.35
3372.30
1271.40
2226.4)

10-11&56
10-19·56
11- 8-56
11-1S-S6

LToknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

11~1Srj6

Not Charged

....

~eiveg

Date

ig.,. L.A.

O:<Y.

5~24-S6

7-24-~6

7-24-56
8& 1·56
10-1 '5 -56
10·1 S-56
10·1 5-56
10·15-56
10·22-56
11· c;-~6
11-19-56
11~ 19-'6

12-21-56
12-13-56
12-17-56

1<'165.00

12-11-56*

12- 6-56

3995.8)

12-14·56

I· 2~5 7

10--10.35
734.35
1072.10
1389.70
935.60
1635.10
1101.05

1- R-57
1-15-57
2- 6-)7
2~ 19-57*
2-19<17*
3-20-57*
4-16<)7

1·10-57
1~ 16-5 7
2-15-57
2&2:5-57
2·25-)7
3-21-57
4-18-.5 7
5· 6-57

(i -30<5 7
5- 9~j7
5- 9-5 7

685.00

5- 9-57

5-13-57

5-16-57

1507.00

5~10-57

628.70

1- 9-5 7
2- S -S 7
2- 5 rS7
2-14-.57

2-25-57
3·15·57

.

822.00
96S.OO
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was for correcting serial numb~rs. No check accompan.i~d it.

12~17-)6

I

APPENDIX E
Me rc hand isc
Model

332X

83771
85296
85291

No.
1852
1852

Date

9r28•J6
9-28-56
9·28-56
9-28-5 6
9-28-)6

No.

Date

Warehouse Receipt

No.

1852
18)2
1852
1852

9~28-56

20)5
2349

232X
232X

8)289
85257
8)287
8)282
85258

11- 7-56
1-17-57
1-17-57
1·17-57
llr 7•56
1-17-57

9-2R-56

2349

1~17-57

14~09

18)2

9~28- )6

203)

232X

.85288

lB52

232X
232X
232X

85259

1852

2349
2033

R)295

LR52

~5290

1~)2

33lX

83126

1892

9-28-56
9-28-5 6
9r28u)6
9-2R-56
10-10-)G

11 r 7<56
1-17-57
ll· 7-'56
1-17-57
1-17-57
ll· 7-56

14-09
14·09
14-09
14-09
14·09
15-09

232X

232X
232X
232X
232X
ri

Serial No.

Invoites on Which ·shown

*Ident[fi~::t

18)2

2033
23-19
2349
2349

23·19

2349
2033

15r09
14-09
14r09
lil~09

14-09
14·09

Date
10r15w56
10-15-56
10-15-56
10-15-56
10-15-56
10r15r)6
10-15-.56
10·C5~56

1 0-15· 56

10-15- )6
l0-15·56
10-15-56
10-l)-)6

fin a I group of delivery orders not signed by plaintiff.
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Deliv~ry

No.
1024

1020
1029*

Order

Date
4- 3-57
1~21·57

1027*

7-57
5- 2-) 7

1026*
1025

4~3Qrj7

1025

1026*
1027*

1026*
1027*

j.

3· 1·57

4-30-57
)r 1•57
5- 2-57
5- 1-57
). 2·57

1022

2~21-57

1024

4- 3<)7

0
\t)

